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STATEMENT OF APPELLANT JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to § 78-2-2(3) and (4) Utah Code Ann. 1996, as amended.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

Whether the Trial Court Erred by Denying Plaintiff#s
Motion for a New Trial Based on the Jury's Inconsistent
and Completely Incomprehensible Answers to the Special
Interrogatories

Standard of Appellate Review: the Appellate Court reviews a
trial court's

conclusions of law for correctness, granting no

deference to the trial judge's legal determinations.

State v.

Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
The judgment on jury verdict was entered by the Court on
January

13,

1999.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Rae

Lyn

Schwartz

("Schwartz") filed a Motion for a New Trial on January 25, 1999.
R. 273-74.

This

issue was preserved

in

the

trial

court by

Schwartz's timely filing of a motion for a new trial.
II.

Whether the Trial Court Erred by Allowing into Evidence
Hearsay Statements Through the Testimony of a Police
Officer Where No Exception to the Hearsay Rule Applied

Standard of Appellate review: the Appellate Court reviews a
trial court's conclusions

of law for correctness, granting no

deference to the trial judge's legal determination.

State v.

Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
At the time of trial, counsel for Schwartz objected to the
statement of Erica B. Wolfe and ^Carolyn" as hearsay.
exception

to the hearsay

rule was provided

by

No viable

the defendant-

appellee, David Benzow pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(Transcript "T." 251:16-25).

2

III. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Failing to Instruct the
Jury That Passing on a Single Lane Road with a Double
Yellow Line Is a Violation of Utah Law

Standard of Appellate Review: the Appellate Courts review a
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial judge's legal determination.

State v.

Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
During the time of trial, counsel for Schwartz requested a
jury instruction that passing is prohibited on a single lane road
with a double yellow line.

The trial court judge did not permit

Schwartz's proposed jury instruction.

3

(T. 313:1-16).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

action

was

Schwartz ("Schwartz").

brought

by

plaintiff-appellant

Rae

Lyn

Schwartz was riding her bicycle on or about

June 4, 1995 near Cedar City, Utah when she was involved in an
accident with a yellow Jeep Wrangler. R. 2-5.

On July 2, 1997

Schwartz filed a Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District for the
State of Utah against Benzow. R. 2-5.

The trial occurred on

November 18, 1998 and November 19, 1998. R. 319-320.

The jury

returned a verdict of no cause of action on November 19, 1998 with
glaring inconsistencies. R. 264-267. On January 13, 1999 the trial
court judge entered Judgment on Jury Verdict. R. 270-272.

On

January 26, 1999 Schwartz filed a Motion for a New Trial. R. 272274.

On March 11, 1999 Judge Robert T. Braithwaite entered an

Order denying Schwartz's Motion for a New Trial. R. 297-299.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The driver of the yellow Jeep Wrangler, defendant-appellee,
David Benzow ("Benzow") passed Schwartz on her bicycle while on
State Road 14, a single lane road in both directions with a double
yellow line between traffic lanes, T. 224.

Schwartz was traveling

down hill at approximately 20 to 25 miles'" per hour. T. 113-114.
Benzow

admits he passed

Schwartz

and the group

of bicyclists

accompanying her immediately prior to the accident. T. 216-218.
Schwartz testified at trial that Benzow slowed down as he passed
her bicycle and bumped her handlebars, causing Schwartz to lose her
balance and fall. T. 117.

As a result of the accident, Schwartz

suffered multiple abrasions to her face, legs and arms, including
permanent scars and sustained severe damage to her teeth. T. 123126.
The basis of Schwartz's motion for a new trial was the blatant
inconsistencies

in the verdict

November 19, 1998. R. 275-278.

sheet

returned by

the

jury on

The jury found that Benzow was not

negligent in the accident involving Schwartz.

However, the jury

found Benzow was a proximate cause or contributing proximate cause
to Schwartz's injuries. Next, the jury found that Schwartz was not
negligent; however, the jury found that Schwartz was a proximate
cause of her own injuries.
neither

party

was

Lastly, despite the findings that

negligent,

the

jury,

in

answering

jury

interrogatory #5, attributed negligence to both Schwartz and Benzow
in the amount of 50% each. R. 264-267.
In addition, during the trial, a police officer testified
5

about

hearsay

accident. T.

statements
252-254.

made

by

Counsel

purported

for

witnesses

to

the

objected

to

the

Schwartz

officer's testimony and no applicable exception to the hearsay rule
was provided. T. 252-253.

Nonetheless, the trial judge permitted

the testimony. T. 252. The Court's ruling was critical because the
hearsay

statements

of

the witnesses

were

the

only

purported

evidence from non-parties which supported the defendant.
Finally,

during

the

trial,

Schwartz

requested

a

jury

instruction stating that passing on a single lane road with a
double yellow line is a violation of Utah law. T. 311-313.

The

judge refused to give this instruction to the jury. T. 313.
Schwartz presents the three above issues for review on appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The special verdict form returned by the jury was confusing
and incomprehensible.

The answers to the special interrogatories

were inconsistent and did not provide a determination that could be
read with any certainty.

In particular, the jury

found that

neither party was negligent, but both parties proximately caused
the accident.
party

Furthermore, on the one hand the jury found neither

negligent,

while

on

the

other

hand

they

assessed

50%

negligence to both parties.
Based upon the jury's obvious inconsistencies, Schwartz moved
for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was defective.

The

trial judge's denial of Schwartz's motion should be reversed and a
new trial granted.
During the trial, Benzow called Officer Bigler to the stand as
a witness.

Officer Bigler testified about his conversations with

two alleged witnesses to the accident.
constituted

hearsay

without

any

The officer's testimony

exception.

Despite

several

objections by Schwartz's counsel, the trial judge permitted the
testimony.

Based upon the erroneous introduction into evidence of

the officer's statements, Schwartz is entitled to a new trial.
Finally, Benzow testified that immediately prior to passing
Ms. Schwartz on her bicycle, he crossed the double yellow line.
During the trial, counsel for Schwartz requested that the jury be
instructed with respect

to no passing

zones. The trial

refused to provide such an instruction.
instruct

the

jury

with

respect

to

the

The court's failure to
relevant

erroneous and Schwartz is entitled to a new trial.
7

judge

statute

was

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED BASED UPON THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE JURY VERDICT
The trial court erred in denying Schwartz's Motion for a New
Trial.

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was based upon the fact

that the completed special verdict form returned by the jury was
confusing, nonsensical and incomprehensible.

R. 273-278.

The

answers given by the jury were completely inconsistent as it first
found Benzow was not negligent, but then determined he was 50%
negligent.

The jury then found Schwartz was not negligent, but

later determined she was 50% negligent.

R. 264-267.

The jury

verdict form could not be read with any certainty or clarity.
Schwartz presented this argument before the trial judge, who denied
her motion for a new trial.

R. 297-299.

Specifically, the jury verdict form was answered as follows:
1.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant David Benzow was negligent?

ANSWER:

No.

2.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
negligence of the defendant David Benzow was either
the

sole

proximate

cause

or

a

contributing

proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:

Yes.
8

3.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do
you

find

from a preponderance

of

evidence

that

plaintiff was negligent?
ANSWER:

No.

4.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the negligence of plaintiff Rae Lyn Schwartz was
either the sole proximate cause or a contributing
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?

ANSWER:

Yes.

5.

If

you

have

answered

"Yes"

to

either

or

both

question 2 and/or 4 then, and only then, answer the
following question:
Assuming

the

combined

negligence

of

the

parties to total 100%, what percentage of that
negligence is attributable to:
a)

David Benzow

50%

b)

Rae Lyn Schwartz

50%

Total:

100%

See Addendum and R. 264-267.
It is readily

apparent

from the jury's

responses

to the

special interrogatories that the jury verdict does not make sense.
While the jury did not find either party negligent, they assessed
50% negligence to both parties. Additionally, while the jury found
neither

party

was

negligent

they

proximately caused the accident.

also

found

both

parties

These are inconsistent responses

requiring a new trial.
9

Where a case is submitted to a jury on special verdicts, the
trial court should grant a new trial when the jury verdict is
incomprehensible and makes no sense.

See, Moore v. Burton Lumber

and Hardware Co., 631 P. 2d 865 (Utah 1981);

see also. Van CIeve

v. Betts, 559 P. 2d 1006, 1012 (Ct. App. Wash. 1977).
A

jury's answers

harmoniously.
obvious

to special

interrogatories must be read

Clearly, the jury verdict in this case contains

inconsistencies,

confirms

juror

confusion and cannot be read harmoniously.

misunderstanding

and

Schwartz is entitled to

a new trial.
Normally, a party is not permitted to move for a new trial on
grounds

that

the verdict was

defective,

if

it

fails

appropriate action before discharge of the jury.

to

take

However, this

rule does not apply when the verdict is so ambiguous, contradictory
and illogical
verdict

that it does not clearly

is rendered

indicate

and the verdict will

for whom the

leave the court and

counsel in a position of having no alternative but to guess at what
the

jury

intended.

Bennion

v.

LeQrand

Company, 701 P. 2d 1078 (Utah 1985).

Johnson

Construction

Here, although counsel for

Schwartz did not raise an objection at the conclusion of the trial,
one is not necessary where the form is incomprehensible.

In fact,

counsel for Schwartz was not provided a copy of the completed jury
form until after

the jury was discharged.

The only

recourse

provided to Schwartz was to file a motion for new trial, which was
done on a timely basis.
The trial court erred in not granting Schwartz's motion for a
new trial.

Judge Braithwaite's Order of March 11, 1999 denying
10

Schwartz a new trial should be reversed and Schwartz should be
granted a new trial.
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POINT II
THE HEARSAY STATEMENT OF ERICA B. WOLFE AND
CAROLYN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT THE TRIAL
Erica B. Wolfe was riding her bicycle immediately behind Rae
Lyn Schwartz, just prior to the accident.
unknown) was also a fellow bicyclist.

Carolyn

(last name

Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn were

allegedly witnesses to the accident involving Schwartz and the
yellow

Jeep

Wrangler.

The

police

officer

investigating

the

accident, Jeffrey Bigler, interviewed Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn hours
after the incident at the hospital.
Officer Bigler was a witness for the defense and was prepared
to testify at trial regarding his conversations with Ms. Wolfe and
Carolyn.

The officer was going to provide testimony based on, and

in connection with, his police report.

Specifically, the officer

was going to testify that Ms. Wolfe told him that: 1. Ms. Wolfe was
riding approximately twelve feet behind and one foot to the right
of

Schwartz;

2. Ms. Wolfe

does

not

remember

a

Jeep

passing

Schwartz; and 3. Ms. Wolfe remembered that Schwartz went down on
the road and Ms. Wolfe ran into her.

He was going to testify that

Carolyn told him that the defendant's Jeep was not near plaintiff
when she fell.
Prior to the presentation of Benzow's case in chief, counsel
for Schwartz objected to Officer Bigler's testimony regarding
Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn.

T. 192:19-25.

'Specifically, James W.

Jensen, counsel for Schwartz, argued in his in limine motion that
Officer Bigler should not be permitted to testify about Ms. Wolfe's
and Carolyn's statements because they were inadmissible hearsay.
12

T. 192:24-25.

The Court denied the motion as premature. T. 198:4-

11.
Thereafter, defendant called Officer Bigler to the stand and
asked him about his conversation with Ms. Wolfe:
Q.

And did Ms. Wolfe describe the accident for
you?

A.

Yes. She did.

Q.

What did she tell you about the accident?

MR. JENSEN:

Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay. T. 251:10-14.

William Stegall, counsel for Benzow responded to the objection
as follows:
Yes, your Honor. First I think that this
information was gathered by Trooper Bigler in
the course of his investigation being done as
part of his duties with the Utah Highway
Patrol trooper that I believe is admissible
under 802 -- 803-8.
Additionally, it would be a statement made by
an individual at or shortly after the event
which transpired, and therefore would be
admissible
under
the
hearsay
exception
regarding statements made at or near the time
of the event recorded. T.251:21-25.
Counsel for Schwartz responded that the exceptions cited to by
Mr. Stegall were inapplicable to this case and referred the court
to the prior in limine motion.

T. 252:2-5.

Despite Mr. Jensen's

objection, the trial judge permitted Officer Bigler to testify to
the hearsay statement of Ms. Wolfe and Carblyn.

T. 252:16-25. The

sole basis for the court's decision was: "Okay. He's just asking
the one question. I'm

going to allow that question. He's not

offering --." T. 252:11-12. No explanation or analysis was given by
13

the Court.

To compound the error, while the trial court stated

that only one question would be allowed,

defense

counsel was

permitted to ask numerous questions which elicited damaging hearsay
statements from the officer.
Wolfe

told

him

she

was

Officer Bigler testified that Ms.

about

twelve

feet

behind

Schwartz

immediately prior to the accident; she did not remember a Jeep
passing Schwartz; and Schwartz just went down and Ms. Wolfe ran
into her.

T. 252:19-25 and 253:10-13.

Pointedly, the officer was allowed to testify that another
biker -- Carolyn -- told him at the hospital, hours after the
accident, that she did not see the Jeep hit Schwartz as the Jeep
was approximately 15 feet ahead of Schwartz when Schwartz went
down. T. 253:14 to 254:3.
The trial court erred by allowing Officer Bigler to testify to
the hearsay

statements of Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn.

First, the

exceptions relied upon by defendant are not applicable.
of Evidence 803(8) has nothing to do with this case.

Utah Rule

See Addendum.

The Rule relates to admission of records and recorded statements.
Here, defendant did not seek to admit Officer Bigler's police
report,

rather, defendant

testify

to out of

court

only

sought

statements

of

to

have

Officer

Bigler

two alleged witnesses.

Second, Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C) is also not applicable. See
Addendum.

Again, that rule relates to admissibility of records.

Here, records are not the issue.

Finally, Officer Bigler spoke to

Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn at the hospital hours after the accident.
The witness statements were not contemporaneous to the accident and
lack credibility.
14

Our case presents classic hearsay without an exception.
allowing

the

hearsay

statements,

Schwartz

was

denied

By
the

opportunity to cross examine Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn and attack,
among other things, the reliability of the statements. Compounding
the situation is that the hearsay statements of Ms. Wolfe and
Carolyn were the only ^evidence" introduced at trial from a nonparty witness to the accident. The statements were the linchpin to
defendant's defense.

As a result of the foregoing, Schwartz is

entitled to a new trial.

15

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY REGARDING NO PASSING
ZONES UNDER UTAH LAW
During the trial, defendant Benzow testified that he passed
Schwartz, a bicyclist, by traveling onto the other side of the road
crossing the double yellow line.

T. 224:9"-13.

As a result, counsel for Schwartz requested a jury instruction
which was labeled as plaintiff's instruction #22. R. 185-195. The
proposed jury instruction cited directly from Utah Code Ann. § 416-59,

regarding

no passing

zones.

Specifically,

counsel

for

Schwartz requested that subsection 2 of § 41-6-59 be used.

T.

311:6-24.
where signs or markers are in place to define
a no passing zone under subsection 1, an
operator may not drive on the left side of the
road in a no passing zone or on the left side
of any pavement striping design to mark the no
passing zone throughout its length.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-59 (2); see Addendum.
The double yellow lines constitute a "marker" as used in Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-59(2).

See Addendum.

Judge Braithwaite refused

to instruct on #22. T. 313:14-16. Counsel for Schwartz objected to
the

judge's

decision

instruction #22.

not

to

use

plaintiff's

proposed

jury

T. 313:20-22.

Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of
the case, it is prejudicial and reversiHle error for the trial
court to fail to instruct thereon.
455

(Utah 1981).

Walters v. Querry, 626 P. 2d

Here, Schwartz's theory was that defendant

crossed the yellow lines and struck Schwartz.
16

It was critical for

the trial court to instruct the jury as to § 41-6-59. If properly
instructed/ the jury would have been told that a violation of a
statute is an inference of negligence.
believed

Benzow

violated

the

statute,

As a result, if the jury
they

could

have

found

defendant negligent and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.
ChiIds v. Gonda, 972 P. 2d 425

(Utah 1998). The trial court's

refusal to charge the jury as to § 41-6-59 was erroneous and
Schwartz is entitled to a new trial.

17

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Schwartz is entitled to a
new trial.

NAGEL RICE & DREIFUSS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

/

Dated: «'''-!

/.

?5

c:wp61data\schwartz\briefapp.uta
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ADDENDUM

rll.Ei)
F,

F T H DISTRICT COURT

' 9 9 f?flH 1 1

m i l 3 3

William A. Stcgall, 3093
KIDMAN & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
6056 S. Fashion Square Drive, Suite 200
Murray, UT 84107
801-281-3788

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RAE LYN SCHWARTZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR
OTHER RELIEF

vs.
Civil No. 970500338
DAVID BENZOW,
Robert T. Braithwaite
Defendant.

Plaintiffs motion for new trial or other relief dated January 25, 1999, was submitted
for decision on February 22, 1999. The court reviewed plaintiff's motion and supporting
memorandum and defendant's memorandum in opposition thereto. Upon the above and
foregoing, and the court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for new trial or other relief is

* o

denied.
Dated this

//

day of March, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

Robert T. Bralthwaite
District Judge

2

029ft

1

DEPUTY CLERK

'L-EZU

° W ^

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

RAE LYN SCHWARTZ,

Civil No. 970500338

Plaintiff,

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

vs.
DAVID BENZOW,
Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer questions 1 through 6 from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." if you find the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or
if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No". Also,
any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance

of the evidence that defendant David Benzow was negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

2.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance

of tne evidence that the negligence of the defendant David Benzow was either the sole
proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes X

No

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance

of the evidence that plaintiff was negligent?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes

No y(

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance

of the evidence that the negligence of plaintiff Rae Lyn Schwartz was either the sole proximate
cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes >C

No

If you have answered u Yes" to either or both Questions 2 and/or 4 then, and

only then, answer the following question:
Assuming the combined negligence of the parties to total 100%, what percentage of that
negligence is attributable to:
A.

David Benzow

B.

Rae Lynn Schwartz
TOTAL:

6.

fiO

%
SO

%
100%

If you have answered -u Yes" to Question 2 and you have attributed to defendant

David Benzow more than 50% ot the total negligence, then, and only then, state the amount of

damages, if any, sustained by plaintiff as a proximate result of plaintiff s injuries. If
Question 2 was answered "No/ or if you have attributed to defendant David Benzow 50%^or
less of the total negligence, then do not answer this question.
A.

Past Medical Expenses

$

B.

Future Medical Expenses •

$

C.

General Damages
(pain and suffering, etc.)

$

TOTAL:

$

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
If you have answered "Yes" to Question 2, and if you have attributed more than 50%
of the total negligence to defendant David Benzow, then, and only then, answer question 7.
Please answer Question 7 from clear and convincing evidence. If you find the evidence
has reached a point where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of
the conclusion based on the evidence, answer "Yes." If there is any substantial doubt as to the
truth or correctness of the conclusion based On the evidence, answer "No."
7.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of

defendant were a result of willful and malicious conduct or conduct that manifested a knowing

and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Dated this

) °\

Yes

No

day of November, 1998.

Foreperson

RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public Records and Reports.
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations r in any
form, or public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)v vthe
activities of the office or agency, or_ (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or
(C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information
or
other
circumstances
indicate
lack
of
trustworthiness.

41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway — No passing
zones — Exceptions*
(1) (a) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may determine those portions of any highway under their respective jurisdictions
where overtaking and passing or driving on the left of the roadway is
especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the
highway indicate the beginning and end of those zones.
(b) When the signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to a
reasonably observant person, every operator of a vehicle snali ooey the
directions.
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone under
Subsection (i), an operator may not drive on the left side of the roadway
within the no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark the no-passing zone throughout its lengths.
(3) This section does not apply to Subsection 41-5-53(l)(b) nor to the operator of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52. $ 49: C. IS4S,
57*7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207. * 17; 197S. ch. 33,
§ 13; 1987. ch. 138, i 58.

